



The Decade of the Big Zeroes 
Jean Dautrey1 
 
The end of the year – and of the first decade of the second millennium – is almost upon us. And 
when calendar milestones pass, they induce reflection. We look back with a sense of incredulity at 
all that occurred in search of lessons to be drawn and peek into the onrushing future; this time, 
however, with more trepidation than is the norm. Understandably so! The last decade – most 
notably the last two years – has brought its shares of surprises, fateful events and zeroes.  
 
Starting with some recent developments, unimaginable and unfathomable a few years ago, this 
comment reflects upon some defining moments, which the decade past has staged and which are 
likely to shape the Asia-Pacific region’s socio-economic political landscape. 
 
Indeed, who in their right mind would have predicted that some iconic U.S. giants, household 
names the world over, would be brought to their knees? Too big to fail; had the likes of General 
Motors and AIG, also become too big to succeed?  
 
And, who in their right mind would have predicted that, after two decades of knee-jerk 
denunciations of government, the United States, of all nations, would be spearheading 
governments’ efforts to save some of the pillars of modern capitalism with taxpayers’ money; in 
essence, turning to public coffers to socialize their risks? Too big to let them fail, it was argued.  
 
Not too long ago, the idea that the government would be bailing out private companies or have a 
say in some aspects of their operations would have sounded radical, even among the left-centre. 
These government-orchestrated rescues in the U.S. and elsewhere mark a departure from the pre-
crisis era of unbridled deregulations and signal a move toward a bigger state role in promoting 
economic growth and more public scrutiny. Will this trend endure?  
 
The overwhelming sense of economic triumphalism that prevailed in America’s business and 
political establishments in the early 2000s has given way to more sobering economic analyses. 
What we are witnessing in the aftermath of the crisis is a breakdown in “the key assumptions that 
formed the basis of the thinking about the efficiency and self-correcting nature of markets, which 
for a long time underpinned the rationale for globalization, liberalization, and deregulation” 
(Giriharadas, 2009). As Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz pointed out, “self-regulation […] was an 
oxymoron […] the market failed to allocate capital and manage risk properly” (The Nations, 
2009).  
 
Still the lessons learned if any, from the near-collapse of the financial world could turn out to be 
short-lived. Witness Washington’s avowed aim to ensure that the banking giants do not keep 
expanding. Yet, the whole system has now grown more concentrated as some too-big-to-be-
allowed-to-fail banks have since then gobbled up some ailing titans, once their domestic 
competitors.2  
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And, adding insult to injury, this is all unfolding amidst a growing chorus of criticisms from 
economists warning that the mammoth size of some of these Wall Street institutions is a threat to 
the financial system at large. But with economists being attacked for failing to foresee or avert the 
financial crisis and caricatured as “a lost generation educated in the use of valueless, even harmful, 
mathematical models,” they may have few ears in Washington (Lucas, 2009).  
 
Although it is best to ignore such nonsense caricature of no value in thinking about the larger 
questions, it would be nonetheless wrong to class all recent attacks of economists – and MBAs – 
as falling into the absurdist camp. There have been thoughtful criticisms (Pant, 2009).3Among all 
the issues raised, two in particular should be mentioned here for future debates: What can the 
public reasonably expect of economists? How well have the public been served by them in the 
current crisis?  
 
There are also troubling signs that some of Wall Street’s excesses, which precipitated the 
economic turmoil, may be returning. Old habits die hard as the much-decried oversized bonuses 
are reminding us. The plan that seems to be shaping up is a classic exercise in ‘lemon socialism’: 
privatization of gains and socialization of losses. Taxpayers bear the cost if things go wrong, but 
stockholders and executives reap the benefits if things go right.4  
 
In the parlance of the industry, investment bankers expect to eat what they kill. However, at a time 
when the world is still reeling from the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, anything 
that smacks of plutocracy is going to arouse justifiable populist anger. The Wall Street argument 
that bonuses are really a part of the overall compensation is not going to fly too well in this 
environment.  
 
Of concerns too are the legislative efforts to curb the excesses of the financial system and rein in 
Wall Street’s over-estimated IT-based capacity in repackaging risks associated with financial 
products. The expected lack of teeth of the emerging financial regulatory landscape, a stark 
reminder of the pressure exercised by interest groups, is a far cry from the earlier Fed-bashing 
rhetoric. Band Aids for gaping wounds? It also underscores a growing tendency for governments 
to err too much on the side of caution; both domestically and internationally. Could all this 
portend of things to come?  
 
To quote Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, “what was truly impressive about the decade past […] 
was [the U.S.] unwillingness, as a nation, to learn from [its] mistakes.” This unwillingness to learn, 
however, is not just the hallmark of one country. No one in the West really learned from the 1997 
Asian economic crisis, because it did not spread to the developed countries (Stiglitz, 2009). And, 
of course, as Einstein once said: “the kind of thinking that created a problem is not the kind of 
thinking that will successfully resolve the problem” (Jones, 2009). In short, it could soon be 
business as usual again with its attendant lack of self-discipline, wild risk-taking, and the blind 
pursuit of profit. 
 
Yet, the typical American family has little to show for the last ten years. To paraphrase Krugman 
again, the decade past should be called “the Big Zero” as it was a decade “with basically zero job 
creation5 […] zero economic gains […] zero gain for US home owners […] and a decade of zero 
gains for stocks even without taking inflation into account.” Obviously, something went awry. 
 
It was not, however, a Big Zero decade across the board. In fact, for some – including some in the 
U.S. – the first decade of the 21st century turned out to be a bonanza; a decade of Big Zeroes 
popping up on the balance sheets and turning companies’ earnings into eight-digit numbers at a 
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neck-breaking pace. Take, for example, China and India: the two emerging economic 
powerhouses. Their GDP growth forecast for 2010 is an astounding eight to nine per cent which, 
save for last year, follows a streak of even more staggering figures unheard of elsewhere.6  
 
There is a de facto new world order with Asia-Pacific as the economic epicenter. China and 
India’s seemingly boundless economic growth is turning the zone into the economic hub of the 
world; all the more as the region is actively pursuing greater economic integration; starting with 
the Asean-China Free Trade Agreement (Asean+1) 7 and Asean Free Trade Area (Afta) 8 due to 
take effect on January 1, 2010.  
 
More schemes are in the making as China, Japan and South Korea (the so-called ‘plus-three’), 
have recently reaffirmed their resolve to pursue closer ties with the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (Asean+3). Plans have also been embraced to expand the 10-member grouping with 
the ‘plus-six partners’: China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India, the latter, as 
part its ‘Look East’ policy,9 (Asean+6).10 Clearly, Asean centrality has received a crucial boost11 
and the 10-nation grouping established itself as the cornerstone of the region’s architecture.12  
 
All of this is coming in addition to Asean’s commitment to establishing a single market; the Asean 
Economic Community (AEC), by 2015. The AEC, however, seems to suffer from a ‘democratic 
deficit’ as the much-hyped EU-style integration is perceived as being market-driven and imposed 
top down (Camroux, 2009). A sense of regional community will thus require efforts from the 
bottom up; all the more given the obsession with the prerogatives of national sovereignty that exist 
in the region, not to mention symbolically-charged territorial disputes. 
 
Asean and China will mutually benefit from these new developments. Asean+1 will create the 
world’s largest free trade zone in terms of population (1.9 billion).13 Increasing Asean access to the 
1.3 billion people of China could produce significant benefits. And trade between China and 
Asean, which soared to US$192.5 billion in 2008 from US$59.6 in 2003, is expected to get 
another big lift with Asean+1, particularly in those nations with commodities that resource-hungry 
China desperately needs.14 It is also estimated that Thailand will gain a surplus of Bt333 billion 
(US$10 billion) per year from intra-Asean trade (The Nation, 2009). 
 
Yet, not everyone considers Afta and Asean+1 be advantageous. While it is too early to see 
whether Afta and Asean+1 will mean boom or bust for Thai businesses, it is safe to say that 
opportunities and threats abound. If nothing else, the very fact that Thailand is taking adaptive 
measures is a clear indication of the challenges ahead.15 
 
Local companies focusing on the production of cheap consumer goods are especially concerned 
that cheap mass-produced Chinese goods may flood their markets once import taxes are removed, 
making it difficult for them to increase their market shares. Afta will also make it easier for non-
Asean firms to operate in Thailand, for instance, without investing in the country itself. By the 
same token, however, companies already operating in Thailand will be able to use Thailand as a 
supply center to other branches within Asean for greater economies of scale.  
 
The negative and positive impacts will not occur in one day, though, which will give producers 
time to adjust. As recognized by Thai officials, the country must adapt to the new economic 
landscape. The private sector has to further develop its competitiveness and identify new niches. 
According to Surin Pitsuwan, Asean Secretary-General, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asean 
in 2008 was US$60 billion, of which only $11 billion was from Asean investors, mostly 
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Singaporean and Malysean, which suggests that a number of Thai corporations have yet to reach 
out internationally.16  
 
What is clear is that Afta and Asean+1 are setting off a dramatic surge in commerce at the most 
propitious moment. With Asia’s exports to the US, European and Japanese markets well below 
pre-financial meltdown levels, the region needs to reduce its dependence on exports to Western 
economies and increase domestic consumption to sustain growth rates. Decoupling Asian 
economies from the West, however, is no easy task. The shift in focus away from export 
dependence will require “developing education and closing the knowledge and IT gaps” (Stiglitz, 
2009). 
 
Whereas not so long ago, stabilizing the world’s economy and providing the impetus to recovery 
would mainly befall the United States, that role is now falling upon China’s shoulders. And 
Thailand, like much of the world, is turning to China with the hope it will be able to lead 
economic growth in the next decade.  
 
China has begun the transition process and is trying to reduce its previous level of reliance on 
exports, focusing on its domestic market. Presently, it is the younger generation that holds the 
greatest promise for its emerging consumer economy. Coming of age during the three-decade-long 
boom, they boast an unflinching confidence in the future. Young urban consumers have no plan to 
change their spending habits and live by the penurious ways of their parents and grandparents. 
They want the best of everything and they want it now (Dautrey, 2009).  
 
The crisis has lifted China’s international status. Its pursuing an “oblique strategy of expanding its 
web of bilateral and international lifelines to nations in trouble” helps trade and can be converted 
into political influence (Buckley and Rabinovitch, 2009). However, much stronger and bigger than 
10 years ago, China is also confronting a new international reality: as it is extending its global 
reach and advancing its broader goals, it is increasingly unable to cast itself as a friendly 
alternative to an imperious American superpower. For many in Asia, and potentially in other 
regions, it is the new colossus that could soon throw its weight around to get things its own way; 
yet, another indication of the profound geo-political-economic changes taking place. 
 
The Sino-American relationship will undoubtedly shape the 21st century. China’s growing 
prominence, though, does not mean it is about to don the cape of a full superpower and is ready to 
jostle with the U.S. for superpower status. This would rub against “its [present] ingrained 
preference for a muted international role” (Ibid). But China may soon have the role of junior 
associates in running the world. Besides, although American economic dominance has been 
injured, China has a long way to go before it surpasses the U.S. in GDP and an even longer one 
before it matches its income per capita (Stiglitz, 2009).  
 
We are entering the post-American world, that is a world beyond America’s brief moment of 
global domination and a world in which the U.S., though no longer dominant, remains the 
indispensable nation among partners. In short, China will not end the U.S. global role or dislodge 
the dollar any time soon. 
 
The economic realities of the 21st century, however, have yet to be reflected in the structures of 
international organizations. The world glaringly needs international institutions that are 
representative of the world of today, not yesterday, and ensure developing nations greater 
influence on the world stage. European countries are simply over represented in the decision-




The recently-approved change in the organic structure of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF),17 though a step in the right direction, remains wide of the mark as it leaves too many 
countries with too little voice and too few opportunities for participation. And even though the 
G20 has agreed to make itself the principle forum for global economic issues, eclipsing the former 
West-dominated G8, emerging countries still fail to have a fair level of representation at existing 
global-level institutions.  
 
In essence, we have been building a global economy without constructing an appropriate global 
regulatory framework. To paraphrase Thailand’s PM, Abhisit Vejjajiva, “if financial instruments 
and investment can freely flow across borders and no institution can truly provide global 
regulations and implement those measures, there is no way we can correct the fundamental 
problems.”18 There are no EU-only or America-only solutions to today’s problems. Global 
institutions and mindsets are needed to address global problems. And real cooperation, not a mere 
show of unity, is needed.  
 
Leaders who gather for international meetings will go to great lengths to demonstrate unity, for 
instance, donning outlandish costumes as a show of unity.19 Still, the convergence on the surface 
often belies much divergence deep down. 
 
Last year, however, they did not need cow boy hats or batik shirts to show the world they were 
acting in unison - or more to the point, speaking in unison. The global financial crisis had done the 
bonding for them. And speaking in unison, they did. They were quick to call for more regulated 
markets and pepper their rhetoric with many good intentions, vowing more transparency, integrity, 
and global governance.  
 
Still, this flurry of good intentions has yet to translate into action. For all the talks of a latter-day 
Breton Woods Conference,20 gone are the thoughts of a new international financial market 
regulator with cross-border authorities. The EU push for closer international coordination of 
regulatory agencies garnered little support from the rest of the world, wary of supra national 
authorities. So did the EU push for tighter control of hedge funds and unregulated securities.  
  
As the failure of the latest round of World Trade Organization (WTO) trade talks (the so-called 
Doha Round) in early December 2009 attests, polarizing dichotomies, especially the industrialized 
versus industrializing nations demarcation, remains the biggest obstacles in addressing 
globalization imbalances.  
 
The December failure was the latest in a long series of failed attempts year after year to broker a 
final agreement. A central obstacle has been a disagreement on agricultural policies and some 
industrial products. Developed countries have yet to reduce farm subsidies and a few remaining 
high industrial tariffs and emerging countries are still reluctant to open trade. Launched in 2001 
and initially scheduled to be concluded in 2004, the Doha Round has witnessed a decade of almost 
‘Zero’ progress. And though G20 leaders have pledged it would be completed in 2010, the world 
should not hold its breath!  
 
Further underscoring the industrialized/industrializing divide are trade disputes.21 Not surprisingly, 
given the perceived increasing threat posed to U.S. manufacturing by newly-industrialized 
countries,22 China and the U.S. have been heavily trading accusations of international trade rules 
violation. The latest irritants: a 35% tariff on Chinese tires, in the wake of domestic campaigns to 
“buy local”.23 The WTO estimated that “anti-dumping” disputes will reach 437 in 2010, double 
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that in 2008. Though it is time to open doors not to erect walls, international trade cooperation is 
fading and non-tariff protectionism rising.  
 
A gulf of opinion between major industrialized and developing nations is also at the core of the 
failure to reach an agreement and turn rhetoric into action at the Copenhagen 15th Conference of 
the Parties to the UN Climate Change Convention (COP15)24 in mid-December, ending up a 
decade of almost ‘Zero’ progress.  
 
Albeit for different reasons, the United States and China, the world’s two largest emitters of 
greenhouse gases are still reluctant to commit to emission reductions commensurate with their 
emission levels. Congress, concerned that countries that do not follow suit will outcompete the 
U.S. in the global market-place, is skittish about passing a new mandate for heat-trapping gases, 
denounced by the Republicans as a “jobs killer.” And China has balked at international 
verification and monitoring, calling such steps a threat to its sovereignty and preferring to act as its 
own watchdog on compliance. 
 
The consequences of the COP15 failure are quite apparent. In the future, firms will have less 
incentive to reduce emissions and invest in innovations that will reduce emissions. And those 
which spent money to reduce their emission worry that doing so would put them at a competitive 
disadvantage as others continue to emit without restraint (Stiglitz, 2009). Many European firms, 
for example, will continue to be at a competitive disadvantage relative to those which bear no cost 
for their emissions. 
 
The environmental discourse, however, is here to stay. With all the media hype surrounding 
COP15, environmental concerns are taking hold of the collective mind and shaping the way we do 
business, use transportation, and perceive MNCs. They are also likely to drive consumer 
preferences in the future, offering opportunities for environmentally correct companies, i.e., 
companies using green technology and churning out eco-products (e.g. eco-cars) to reach these 
consumers.  
 
Eco-concerns have also entered the corporate boardroom as MNCs recognize that by being 
environmentally responsible, they can build trust and improve their image - therefore becoming 
more competitive. Here is a figure worth considering: the first annual corporate environmental 
report was published early in the 1990s; in 2007 over 2,000 companies publish such reports every 
year (Hill, 2008). Clearly, MNCs are wary of their constituents’ expectations and the 
repercussions of not meeting them. 
 
It is also likely that at some point in the future MNCs will be expected to take responsibility for 
their products from cradle to grave, i.e., plan for a final stage in the product life cycle, (the “post-
mortem” stage), all of which requiring corporate investment even after the product has ceased to 
create revenue (Czinkota, 2008).  
 
As suggested by the Map Ta Phut impasse, the tension between economic interests and 
environmental concerns requires a tricky balancing act. The Thai Supreme Administrative Court 
decision to uphold a lower court’s injunction against 65 industrial projects, while good news for 
the environment climate, may be bad news for the investment climate.25 
 
A brief aside: consider another milestone. The human population became majority-urban for the 
first time; an amusing anecdote yet one symbolically charged as the cities’ anonymity exemplifies 
the growing anonymity elsewhere in our lives (Giriharadas, 2009). As outsourcing and off-shoring 
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are growing, so is anonymity in the workplace. Virtual connectedness has become ordinary: 
virtual business meetings, virtual banking, virtual credit-default swaps, etc. In short, anonymity 
became human: a gain? ‘Zero’ gain? As with most issues, there is no straight forward or ready 
answer.  
 
In conclusion, let’s dispense with the fiction that trade frictions will suddenly end and big global 
pacts, long non-starters, suddenly be inked. Whatever will unfold in the years to come hinges 
largely on our willingness – or unwillingness – to learn from past events; that is, not merely 
diagnose what caused the ills but also apply the proper remedies and adopt preventive measures. It 
also largely hinges upon Asia, which, with the world’s fastest-growing markets, holds to a large 
extent the key to the future global geo-political economic order (Chellaney, 2009). Never before 
have China, Japan and India all been strong at the same time. Whether the next decade ends with a 
multi-polar world and uni-polar Asia, a uni-polar world and multi-polar Asia, or a multi-polar 
world and multi-polar Asia is still unclear. What the past decade has made clear, though, is that a 
uni-polar world is the least desirable option. The question that remains, then, is whether lessons 
have been learned from it.  
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5The zero net-job creation in the first decade of the new millennium was also pointed out by Philip Martin, an 
economist at the University of California at Davis, at a recent panel discussion in Bangkok.  
 
6In fact, in most cases, the GDP growth is likely to remain in close-to-negative territory, with high unemployment.  
 
7In 2004, China entered into an agreement with Asean to create Asean+1 with the target of reducing duties on most 
goods to zero by 2010. Intra-Asean trade has a 550-combined population. 
 
8Afta was signed in 2002. Most of the goods are currently subject to 5%. Some agricultural products will still face 
tariffs but will be gradually phased out. As provided by Afta, Asean’s new members (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam) have until 2015 to gradually reduce their tariffs which must be eliminated by then. 
 
9According to Indian Commerce and Industry Minister, “China is a trade rival but also a close trade partner, The 
Nation, “Exclusive Interview,” August, 16, 2009. 
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bloc through the “East Asia Free Trade Agreement” (EAFTA) and “comprehensive Partnership in East Asia” (CEPEA) 
within 15 years.  
 
13And the world’s third largest free trade area right behind the EU and NAFTA in terms of volume. 
 
14China is Asean’s third trading partner after Japan and the EU. 
 
15Some officials think a certain amount of protection will be needed as domestic markets will adjust to a possible 
explosion of consumer imports: an Afta fund has been set; regulations to ensure the quality of farm-good imports and 
protect Thai consumers will be adopted; and an excise tax hike on alcoholic beverages to prevent cheaper foreign-
made beer and spirits from flooding the market is also being considered.  
 
16The Nation, “Thai firms should look more to Asian consumers,” December 2, 2009. “Most of them operate in the 
local environment and expand their empires through contracts with the government instead of trying to compete in the 
global market” (Ibid, 12A). 
 




18The Nation, “Asia: Road to New Economy,“ September 1, 2009 (p. 3A). 
 
19This example is in reference to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
 
20This is in contrast to the role that it played after the Great Depression when it was instrumental in organizing the 
Breton Woods Conference in 1944 which resulted in the establishment of the IMF and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
 
21The crisis becomes a general excuse to block imports and favour domestic firms. At least 130 protectionist measures 
such as state funds, higher tariffs, immigration restrictions and export subsidies, are being planned by world 
governments. 
 
22Yet manufacturing in the U.S. employs fewer workers than in the service sector, which employs 75 per cent of the 
labor force. 
 
23Disputes between Washington and Beijing continue to grow. It started with the U.S. putting a 35% tariff on Tyres 
from Chine last Sept. China followed by putting tariffs on chickens, steel, nylon, autos, paper and salt. The US says it 
is only protecting the country’s rights while China counters that the U.S. started the whole thing by launching an 
unprovoked attack.  
 
24The COP15 took place from December 7-18, 2009.  
 
25Investment sentiments have been dampened by the Map Ta Phut impasse. Thailand is losing its attractiveness 
because of unpredictability and risks. According to the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), Japanese investors 
have been affected by nine industrial projects out of 64. 
 
